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Abstract
Bubbles can persist because investors are better off riding bubbles. We define
bubbles in a natural way as significant, prolonged deviations from fundamental val-
ues measured by the well-known asset pricing models. Our real-time bubble detection
system shows that–using US industry returns–periods of both higher volatility and
higher abnormal returns follow noisy positive bubble signals. However, for the typ-
ical investor the risk-return trade-off improves. Riding bubbles generates annual
abnormal returns of three to nine percent. These conclusions are robust to different
assumptions and our system allows for alternative multifactor models as proxies for
fundamental value.
Key words: bubbles, limits to arbitrage, market efficiency, structural breaks
JEL classification: G10, G14, C14
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Introduction
An unanswered question in finance is whether asset price bubbles can persist or even
inflate in the presence of rational investors. The answer to this question directly depends
on whether investors benefit from bubbles. Our results suggest they do. We define a
bubble in a straightforward way that is in line with the literature; for instance, Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003) or the Minsky model as described by Kindleberger (2000). Firstly,
a bubble requires a prolonged period of price growth that is higher than the growth rate
of the asset’s fundamental value. Secondly, the growth rate of the price should experience
a sudden, significant acceleration. These two conditions capture the main characteristics
of asset price bubbles. For proxies of the growth rates of fundamental values, we use
the traditional asset pricing models: the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965), the three-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993),
and the four-factor model introduced by Carhart (1997). However, our approach can easily
be used with other multifactor models. Based on these conditions and models, we develop
a new real-time bubble detection system. As a result, our bubble signals are not perfect
in real time, but in line with the uncertainty an investor faces when deciding whether or
not a bubble might be growing.
Most of the famous historical bubbles started in industries. Examples are the recent
housing bubble (1998-2009), the internet bubble (1995-2000), the tronics boom (1959-
1962) or the railway mania (1840s). Therefore, industries seem a natural candidate for our
analysis. We apply our bubble detection system to the 48 Fama and French (1997) US
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industry returns from 1926 to 2009.
While we formally introduce our bubble detection system in Section 1, an example
might help to shape the reasoning underlying our approach. An investor might use the
CAPM as a proxy for fundamental value and run regressions of the industry returns on
market returns over the past ten years. In these regressions the investor looks for the
largest positive and statistically significant structural break in the intercept (i.e., Jensen’s
alpha) in the most recent five to one years based on the test statistic of Andrews (1993).
The minimum of one year excludes short-term deviations. If there is a significantly positive
break, then a bubble might be forming and the investor needs to check (1) whether the
intercept following the break point is significantly positive and (2) whether there has not
been a crash in the last six months that might have ended the bubble. If both conditions
are met, the investor assumes that there is a bubble and the signal is positive for the next
month. As the signal is updated every month, the investor captures bubbles with life spans
of at least one year and a maximum of five years. Our system works well in the sense that
the bubbles are in line with the general perception. In our base scenario, bubbles tend
to be rare: they only occur between three and five percent of the time. Bubble growth is
economically significant: the bubbles grow (in deviation from fundamental value) by about
two percent a month. And they are here for the long run: the average bubble lasts around
thirty months. The average bubble can therefore have a total price deviation of about
sixty percent, which conforms well with the general concept of bubbles. Just like investors,
we face a large number of choices in the development and implementation of a real-time
system. We test a large number of realistic choices and our results are robust. Simulations
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show that our method is–not surprisingly–noisy. Nevertheless, the system clearly detects
famous bubbles over the last ninety years like the tronics boom, the internet bubble and the
bubble in concept stocks in 1967 and 1968. Our bubbles correlate well with the sentiment
indicators of Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006).
When we analyze the return distributions in months immediately following the positive
bubble signals, we find that investors benefit from bubbles. Firstly, abnormal returns
are significantly higher following the positive bubble signals. Secondly, we find significant
increases for various risk measures. Evaluating both effects together, we find that the
overall risk-return trade-off improves. The difference in monthly abnormal returns is about
0.43% for both the Fama-French and the Carhart models. Bubble signals in a CAPM
framework generate monthly abnormal returns of 0.80% per month. Volatility increases
by 14% for the CAPM and 19% for the other two models. Downside risk measures like
value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) show comparable increases. This analysis
errs on the side of caution: the returns include crashes when the bubble bursts, which
explains the increase in risk measures following positive bubble signals. In that case the
bubble signal is positive but the industry crashes in the next month.
To find out whether an investor should ride, sideline, or short an industry experiencing
a bubble, we investigate the asset allocation implications of the bubble signals for typical
investors. Power-utility investors substantially increase their optimal weight if they receive
a positive bubble signal. This increase is statistically and economically significant. Portfolio
weights as a fraction of wealth go up by 0.79 (Fama-French model), 0.93 (Carhart model),
and 1.62 (CAPM) for an investor with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to two.
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We also compute the risk-free return required as compensation for not increasing the
weight after a positive signal. On a yearly basis, these certainty equivalents are 1.76%
(Fama-French model), 2.43% (Carhart model) and 7.38% (CAPM). A simple dynamic
riding bubble strategy earns annual abnormal returns of three to four percent based on the
Fama-French and Carhart models, and nine percent for the CAPM. These conclusions are
robust to different preferences. Investors who are particularly averse to skewness, kurtosis,
or downside risk also ride bubbles.
Assumptions are inherent to developing a bubble detection system but our main results
are insensitive to many variations in these assumptions. For instance, we test for robustness
against different estimation windows, different significance levels, different risk measures,
different investor preferences, and different asset pricing models. Robustness checks and
tables displaying the results for each of the 48 industries are in an online appendix.1
We also examine several alternative explanations for our findings. One alternative is a
misspecification of the asset pricing model. We show that an omitted structural break in
any of the risk factors, an omitted risk factor, or a structural break in an omitted risk
factor are not likely to explain our results. We compare the industry bubbles to industry
momentum, as described by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), but find that bubbles are
distinct phenomena. Also underreaction to good news does not explain our results because
bubbles are followed by negative returns over the following two years.
Although investors might see our real-time bubble detection system as practically useful
or even as a stock-market prediction system, we feel that the main contribution of our
1Available at http://people.few.eur.nl/kole/RidingBubbles_webappendix.pdf.
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paper is that it helps answer the important question of why bubbles persist. We show
empirically that exerting a correcting force on prices during bubbles, as Fama (1965)
suggests, is not optimal. Our empirical evidence also does not indicate that shorting the
overvalued asset is too risky as De Long et al. (1990a) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
propose. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003) and De Long et al. (1990b), short-term expected returns after positive bubble
signals are positive. Riding bubbles is a risky though highly profitable strategy. While the
arbitrageurs in the theoretical work of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) are risk-neutral,
our empirical results indicate that riding bubbles is even optimal for risk-averse investors.
Our results also add to the empirical literature that explains why bubbles continue by
focusing on specific well-known historical bubble episodes. The papers most closely related
to our work are Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Temin and Voth (2004). Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2004) show that hedge-fund managers were profitably riding the technology
bubble in the late 90s. Temin and Voth (2004) provide similar evidence for a London-based
bank during the South Sea bubble in 1720. We generalize the findings of Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2004) and Temin and Voth (2004) to a large population of bubbles and investors.
Riding bubbles is not only optimal for highly sophisticated institutional investors but also
for a prototype risk-averse investor with a very basic information set. Even these investors
have been able to profit from bubbles because the run-ups last for sufficiently long periods.
This finding is not limited to a specific bubble, but applies to a large sample of bubble
periods. We further complement previous work by focusing on the optimal strategy in
real time. Our setup mimics the situation of a real-world investor who needs to make a
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choice at every point in time, without knowing whether a positive bubble signal is correct.
Extracting bubble signals at every point in time is a noisy process. Because positive signals
that are ”truly” just noise are not followed by positive abnormal returns, our approach is
realistic and conservative by comparison to focusing on famous historical bubbles.
1 Bubbles and Bubble Signals
1.1 A Basic Bubble Model
We summarize our bubble model in Table 1. Before time s0, everything is normal. Both
the price, ps, and the asset’s fundamental or intrinsic value, pi,s, grow at the equilibrium
rate in an asset pricing model. The equilibrium growth rate of intrinsic value follows a
factor model, rf,s + β
′fs, where rf,s is the risk-free rate and fs is a vector of factors. The
growth rate of the price rf,s + β
′fs + es is stochastic because we add the zero-mean error
term es.
[Table 1 about here.]
Between s0 and s1, due to some good news, the growth rates of the asset’s price and
its intrinsic value accelerate. Both rates increase by an amount a, for example, on some
news that productivity in an industry structurally improves. Kindleberger (2000, p. 14)
describes this sudden acceleration as a displacement in a Minsky model. At a certain point
in time, as described by Shiller (2000), “irrationally exuberant” investors who believe in a
“new economy” overestimate the impact of the new technology and prices rise above their
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intrinsic values. In our model, this exuberant extrapolation occurs between s1 and s2 as
the intrinsic value grows again at the equilibrium rate, but the price continues to grow at
the higher rate. A bubble, pb,s, starts growing at rate a as illustrated in Figure 1. Between
s2 and s3 the bubble bursts and the prices decline at rate ds. After the correction has
taken place, the prices and their intrinsic values grow again at the equilibrium rate.
[Figure 1 about here.]
In line with Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), our model does not put any restrictions
on a and differs from the rational bubble models where the (expected) growth rate of the
bubble a has to satisfy the Euler equation in an asset pricing model (see Campbell et al.,
1997, Ch. 7 or Cochrane, 2005, Ch. 20). The rational bubble models (e.g., Blanchard and
Watson, 1982) impose this condition because they assume that investors are indifferent
between selling or investing in the asset. Inherently, our research question does not apply
to this specific type of bubble. Therefore, we also do not use existing tests for rational
bubbles such as Campbell and Shiller (1987), Diba and Grossman (1988), Phillips et al.
(2010), or Jarrow et al. (2011). Instead, we develop our own method to derive bubble
signals.2
2Rational bubbles cannot be negative (see Blanchard and Watson, 1982)). For “irrational” bubbles it
is not obvious whether they can be negative and one could potentially consider applying our method to
negative bubbles. We focus on positive bubbles in this paper.
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1.2 Bubble Signals
At the end of each month t, we try to infer whether there is a bubble, as defined in the
previous section, to make an investment decision for the immediately following month t+1.
If we find evidence of a potential bubble by using prices up to and including month t, then
the signal is positive for month t+1. If there is no evidence of a bubble, then the signal is
negative. We denote Bi,t = 1 (Bi,t = 0) as a positive (negative) bubble signal for industry
i.
To derive signals, we follow a three-step procedure. First, we estimate in every month
t for each industry an asset pricing model and test for a structural break in the intercept
αi,t,τ :
ri,t−τ = αi,t,τ + β
′
i,tft−τ + εi,t,τ , E[εi,t,τ ] = 0, E[ε
2
i,t,τ ] = σ
2
i,t, τ = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 (1)
where ri,t−τ is the return on an industry i, ft−τ is a vector of factors, and T is the length
of the estimation window.3 The null hypothesis occurs when αi,t,τ experiences no break.
The alternative is a structural break for some unknown point ζ :
H1T (ζ) : αi,t,τ =


αai,t(ζ) for τ = ζ + 1, ζ + 2, . . . , T − 1
αpi,t(ζ) for τ = 0, 1, . . . , ζ
with ζL ≤ ζ ≤ ζU , αpi,t(ζ) > αai,t(ζ),
(2)
3We use two time subscripts because our bubble detection system uses a moving window. The subscript
t indicates the point in time where the investor makes his decision, and where his information set ends.
The first t for which we can conduct an estimation equals T . The subscript τ runs back in time to the
point where the estimation window starts, that is, T months ago.
10
where αai,t(ζ) refers to the part of our test period before the structural break, and α
p
i,t(ζ)
to the part after the structural break. For each value of ζ , we calculate the t-statistic for
the hypothesis αai,t(ζ) = α
p
i,t(ζ). We select the breakpoint ζ
∗ with the largest t-statistic
and determine its critical value based on the tables in Andrews (1993).4 In case there
is no break, the bubble signal is negative. We end the three-step procedure, move one
month forward and start again with step one. If a positive structural break occurs, then
we proceed to step two.
In the second step, we test whether the intercept after the breakpoint αpi,t(ζ
∗) is signif-
icantly positive using a standard t-test (see Bai, 1994; Bai and Perron, 1998). A positive
structural break can also occur if αai,t(ζ
∗) is negative, and αpi,t(ζ
∗) is close to zero. This
pattern resembles underperformance and its subsequent correction. Within reason, we do
not want to interpret this type of break as a positive bubble signal. Therefore, if αpi,t(ζ
∗)
is not significantly positive, then the bubble signal is negative and we start with step one
of our procedure for the next month. If αpi,t(ζ
∗) is significantly positive, then we continue
with step three.
In the third and final step of the signal detection procedure, we test whether a crash has
happened during the last κ months. A crash is defined as a value of εi,t,τ in Equation (1)
below a cut-off point. We choose the cut-off point as a multiple k of the standard deviation
4Andrews (1993) discusses two-sided tests for the detection of a structural break, whereas our alternative
hypothesis is one-sided. Estrella and Rodriguez (2005) derive the corresponding asymptotic distribution of
the t-statistic. They show that halving the p-value for a given critical value when moving from a two-sided
to a one-sided alternative gives a good approximation.
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σi,t of εi,t,τ . The end of a bubble is often associated with one or more crashes. If we find
crashes, then the bubble has ended, that is, the bubble signal is negative. If we find no
crashes, then the bubble signal is positive for month t for a specific industry. Because this
is the last step of our procedure, in either case, we continue with the next month for this
industry. Once we have a positive or negative signal for every month in an industry, we
move to the next industry. Ultimately, we end up with a positive or negative bubble signal
for every month in every industry.
As noted in the introduction, bubbles often occur in industries; therefore, it seems
reasonable to apply our bubble detection system to the 48 industry portfolios of Fama and
French (1997). This data set contains value-weighted returns from July 1926 to December
2009. We consider three commonly applied asset pricing models, the CAPM, the Fama
and French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model. The CAPM of Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965) contains only the market factor. The Fama-French model has
three factors: the market factor, the size factor (SMB), and the value versus growth factor
(HML) (Fama and French, 1993). The Carhart four-factor model adds the momentum
factor (MOM) to the Fama-French model based on the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993) and Carhart (1997).5
Our procedure to obtain bubble signals can depend on parameter choices. However,
5Because data on momentum are only available as of January 1927, our analysis for the Carhart model
has six months less observations than the analysis for the Fama-French model and the CAPM. All factor
portfolios and the risk-free rate are taken from French’s Data Library at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.
edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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Appendix A shows that results are robust for a wide variety of choices. For our main anal-
ysis, we choose a confidence level of 97.5% for the structural break test in Equation (2)
and the subsequent t-test on αpi,t(ζ
∗), if applicable. This level is in between two common
choices, 95% and 99%, for which we report results in the Appendix. We choose an es-
timation window of ten years, that is, T = 120, and allow ζ to range from ζL = 12 to
ζU = 60. The minimum of ζL = 12 corresponds to the maximum lag of twelve months for
news to be incorporated into prices. This lag refers to the time between s0 and s1 in our
model. Because bubbles are associated with an overreaction to salient news, one year is
a conservative choice. According to Chan (2003), a market reaction to positive headline
news only lasts a couple of months. We set ζU equal to 60 months and thus bubbles can
last a maximum of five years. In our model, that is the time between s1 and s3. Looking at
famous historical bubbles, these choices are reasonable. For example, the run-up in prices
in the railway boom lasted from 1841 to 1845 (Gayer et al., 1940), the “Roaring Twenties”
were from about 1925 to October 1929 (White, 1990, and Donaldson and Kamstra, 1996),
the “tronics boom” lasted from about 1957 to December 1961 (Malkiel, 1996, and Brown,
1991), and the internet bubble lasted roughly from 1995 to 2000. Our robustness checks
in Appendix A, consider a T of five years with a ζU of 36 months. Additionally, we also
decrease ζU to 36 months and increase it to 84 months for a T of 120 months. Here, we
classify a return below two standard deviations as a crash and thus choose k = 2. Ap-
pendix A considers the cases of k = 2.25 or k = 1.75. We take crashes into account that
are up to six months prior to t (κ = 6). To examine the robustness of our results to this
choice, we increase κ to 12 months or decrease it to zero, implying that the crash criterion
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is removed. The results are similar.
1.3 Descriptive Statistics for Bubble Signals
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the bubble signals. Panel A shows the fre-
quency of the positive versus negative bubble signals. We derive signals for the complete
sample of 48 industries from 1926 to 2009 that yields 39,696 signals for the CAPM and
the Fama-French model, and 39,456 for the Carhart model. For the CAPM, 5% (1,966 of
39,696) of the signals are positive. We find less signals if we use the three- or four-factor
model. For these models, about 3.4% of the bubble signals are positive. In line with the
idea that bubbles are rare events, 96.6% of the signals are negative.
Panel B of Table 2 focuses on the positive signals. The first two rows show the intercepts
before and after the breakpoint. The average of the intercept before the break, αai,t, is
slightly negative, but economically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The
average of the intercept after the break, αpi,t, is economically large and, by construction,
significantly positive. Closely related, we report the “strength” of the bubble signal and
define it as the t-statistic of αpi,t in row four. Both the average and median strength are close
to three and indicate that most bubble signals pass the second condition (i.e., αpi,t > 0)
easily. We define the “length” of the bubble signal, shown in row five, as the time between
the breakpoint ζ∗ and t. On average, the time since the breakpoint is much longer than the
minimum length of 12 months. For the CAPM-based bubble signals, the average (median)
length is 33.9 (31) months. The mean (median) length of the bubble signals for the three-
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and four-factor models are slightly shorter at around 30 (26) months.
[Table 2 about here.]
Bubbles derived from the signals are discussed in Section 4. Their characteristics are
in line with the general perception of bubbles, and the system detects famous bubbles over
the last ninety years like the tronics boom, the internet bubble, and the bubble in concept
stocks. Although simulations show our method is noisy, the resulting bubbles correlate
well with other proxies for mispricing.
2 Risk and Return After Bubble Signals
To find out whether an investor should short, stay away, or ride a bubble, we compare the
returns that follow positive and negative bubble signals. We construct two portfolios based
on the bubble signals at the end of month t and compare their risk-return characteristics for
the immediately following month t+1. The first portfolio is named the “bubble portfolio”
and contains the industries for which we have a positive bubble signal Bi,t = 1. If we do
not have a positive signal for any industry, then we do not invest this portfolio. Note that
this portfolio has large negative returns if after a bubble, the industry crashes and our
bubble detection system has not picked up that the bubble ended. The second portfolio,
the “no-bubble portfolio,” contains the industries for which we have a negative signal
Bi,t = 0. Similar to Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), the portfolios are equally weighted at
the industry level, but value weighted within industries. As a robustness check, we devise
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a strategy that is value weighted at the industry level in Appendix A.4 and get similar
results. The first rows of Table 3 provide descriptive statistics for the two portfolios. The
no-bubble portfolio is continuously invested, well-diversified with an average of more than
40 industries, and has a turnover of less than 20%. Because most of the industries are in
the no-bubble portfolio, this portfolio closely resembles a market portfolio. Very differently,
the bubble portfolio is invested in only 69% (CAPM) or 64% (Fama-French and Carhart
models) of the months. It contains on average 3.2 industries for the CAPM and 2.4 for
the Fama-French and Carhart models. The number of industries in the portfolio varies
strongly: the standard deviation of the number of industries is 2.64 for the CAPM, 1.49
for the Fama-French model, and 1.51 for the Carhart model. The bubble portfolio also has
a very high turnover. Monthly turnover for the CAPM is 179%, which comes close to the
possible maximum of 200% (if all industries leave the portfolio and new ones enter). For
the Fama-French and Carhart models, turnover is 145% per month.
The bubble portfolio earns much higher returns in excess of the risk-free rate than the
no-bubble portfolio. If we derive the signals using the CAPM, then the excess return on
the bubble portfolio is 1.7% per month compared to an excess return of only 1.01% on
the no-bubble portfolio. Similarly, if we get bubble signals from the four-factor model, the
monthly excess return on the bubble portfolio is 56 basis points higher than the excess
return on the no-bubble portfolio. It seems that the higher return comes to some extent at
the expense of a higher portfolio risk. Across all specifications, the volatility of the bubble
portfolio is higher than the volatility of the no-bubble portfolio. Still, the bubble portfolio
has substantially higher Sharpe ratios than the no-bubble portfolio, ranging between 22%
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higher for the Fama and French model to 50% higher for the CAPM.
We now consider whether these results hold for risk-return measures based on abnormal
returns. Because the composition of the bubble portfolio is highly unstable, estimates based
on a single performance-attribution regression that imposes constant factor exposures over
time are likely to be biased. We allow for time-varying factor exposures by using a rolling-
window approach as in Carhart (1997), and compute abnormal returns for t+ 1 as:
ηi,t+1 = ri,t+1 − βˆ′i,tft+1, (3)
where the ri,t+1 is the excess return at t+1 for industry i, and βˆi,t is a vector of estimates
based on Equation (1) under the null hypothesis. We always use the same factor model
to compute abnormal returns as for the bubble signals. For example, if we derive bubble
signals with the Carhart model, we also use that model to compute the abnormal returns.
The abnormal returns on the bubble portfolio are significantly larger both economically
and statistically than the abnormal returns on the no-bubble portfolio. For the CAPM,
Jensen’s alpha is 76 basis points per month for the bubble portfolio and only six basis points
for the no-bubble portfolio. For the three-factor and four-factor models, the differences are
smaller but still sizable. For the four-factor model, the difference in abnormal returns is
30 basis points per month, which amounts to 3.6% per year. The test results in Table 3(b)
show that we reject the hypothesis of equality of the average abnormal returns of the
bubble and the no-bubble portfolios with p-values below 1%. We conduct these tests in
weighted least-squares (WLS) and generalized least-squares (GLS) settings. Because of its
highly unstable composition, returns on the bubble portfolio are strongly heteroscedastic.
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Tests based on ordinary least squares do not suffice in this case. Unlike the often-used
White standard errors, the GLS and WLS tests allow us to take into account the form
of heteroscedasticity, thus leading to more efficient estimates (see e.g., Verbeek, 2004).
Consistent with the construction of the abnormal returns in Equation (3), we use the
variances and covariances of the residuals in Equation (1) under the null hypothesis to
construct the variances of the portfolios (see Appendix A.4 for details). The WLS tests
assume that the returns of the bubble and the no-bubble portfolios are independent, while
the GLS test allows for dependence. The test results for the GLS are weaker than for the
WLS, but still significant at the 1% level. Our tests for the value-weighted portfolio in
Appendix A.4 also show significant differences with p-values below 5%.
[Table 3 about here.]
Figure 2 confirms that the bubble portfolio earns consistently higher returns than the
no-bubble portfolio. The graphs also suggest that a bubble riding strategy is very risky.
The results based on the Fama-French and Carhart models especially show that investors
holding the bubble portfolio sometimes face very steep losses.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In line with this observation, Table 3(a) shows that the variances and downside risk
measures are much higher for the bubble portfolio than for the no-bubble portfolio. There
are two potential explanations for this finding. First, a strategy of riding bubbles might be
very risky as investors are likely to experience the negative returns of bursting or deflating
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bubbles. Second, however, the bubble portfolio might just seem more risky than the no-
bubble portfolio because it is less diversified. Further, although the differences in risk are
large in magnitude, it is not obvious in this setting whether they are statistically significant.
Because the portfolio returns are strongly heteroscedastic, we cannot use standard tests
for differences in variances and other risk measures.
We complement our results at the portfolio level by analyzing the returns following
positive and negative bubble signals at the asset level. We pool the complete sample of
abnormal returns across all industries and for all months. Then, we split it into two sets.
The first (second) set contains all abnormal returns at t + 1 for which we have a positive
(negative) bubble signal at t. This approach has three main advantages. First, it allows
us to abstract from differences imposed by portfolio construction, notably, differences in
diversification. Second, this setup makes it possible to conduct statistical tests using boot-
straps, which are based on less stringent assumptions than the WLS or the GLS. This
approach thus ensures the robustness of our findings for the portfolios. Third, using boot-
straps, we can formally test for differences in variances, skewness, kurtosis, and downside
risk.
We standardize the abnormal returns by dividing them by the residual standard devi-
ation to accommodate time-varying volatilities and different volatilities across industries
(η˜i,t+1 ≡ ηi,t+1/σi,t). Then, we compute means, medians, higher moments, and downside
risk measures. Table 4 shows the results for both sets of returns. The standard errors
reported in parentheses are based on a temporal bootstrap as in Kapetanios (2008) and
Lahiri (2003) to accommodate cross-sectional correlations in abnormal returns. Although
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we report standard errors for convenience, our real interest is in testing for differences be-
tween both distributions. We conduct a second bootstrap under the null hypothesis that
the two distributions are equal and compute quantiles. If the p-value is 5% or smaller (95%
or larger), we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the characteristic is significantly
larger (smaller) following a positive signal rather than following a negative signal.
The p-values for the tests on the mean and median abnormal returns are well below
1% for all three asset pricing models. Abnormal returns are economically and statistically
significantly larger following positive bubble signals than following negative signals. The
results also show that variances and downside risks are higher following positive signals
than following negative signals, even when diversification effects do not play a role. For
the CAPM-based results, only volatility is significantly higher following positive bubble
signals. However, for the Fama-French and Carhart models the volatility, VaR, and ES
are significantly higher following positive rather than negative signals. For example, for
the Carhart model, abnormal return volatility is 1.08 after a negative signal and rises to
1.28 after a positive signal. The p-value is well below 1%. Skewness and kurtosis are not
significantly different.
[Table 4 about here.]
Overall, the results suggest that investors face a trade-off. Riding bubbles is a profitable
though highly risky strategy. At this point, we can already conclude that it is the optimal
strategy for risk-neutral investors as proposed by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
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2.1 Sequences of Positive Bubble Signals and Profitability of
Strategy
To gain more insights on why a strategy of riding bubbles is profitable, we investigate how
the returns following positive signals depend on the length of a (uninterrupted) sequence
of positive signals. Table 5 shows the duration, number of sequences per duration, and
their average abnormal returns. Most sequences last only a few months. Thus, the bubble
signals are associated with rather short investment opportunities. However, the short
sequences are not the profitable ones. Instead, only longer sequences are associated with
positive abnormal returns. We also look at the last return of each sequence and how many
sequences end with crashes. Only about 19% end with a crash. This finding supports
Brunnermeier (2008) who suggests that although bubbles end with crashes in theoretical
models, they deflate in reality.
We look at the average last return in relation to the length of the sequence. The average
standardized abnormal return in the last month of a series is about -1.15, which amounts
to an abnormal return of approximately -4.6%. There is little relation between the length
of the sequence and the magnitude of the last return. This finding helps to explain why
riding short bubbles is not profitable. Investors earn less on the ride up, but given that
they cannot time the crash or deflation, they still face substantial losses before they get
out. For bubbles that grow over a long time, and then deflate slowly, investors can profit
from riding the bubble without having to suffer the full extent of the deflation.
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) show that hedge-fund managers as sophisticated in-
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vestors were able to profit from the internet bubble and get out in time. Our analysis
shows that there is not much skill or superior information needed to make riding bubbles
a profitable strategy. Even an investor with basic information that consists only of returns
is able to profit from a run-up if the bubble lasts long enough.
[Table 5 about here.]
3 Optimal Response
Following a positive bubble signal, abnormal returns and risk are significantly higher than
after negative signals. To evaluate this trade-off and determine an optimal strategy, we
take the perspective of a utility maximizing risk-averse investor. Here in the main paper,
we focus on a power-utility investor. But Appendix A.5 shows the results for downside
risk-averse investors, mean-variance investors, and investors who are particularly averse to
skewness and kurtosis. The results are robust.
If investors significantly increases the weight of the asset when they receive a positive
bubble signal, then we conclude that the optimal strategy is to ride bubbles. To the
contrary, if investors significantly decrease their position, then we conclude that investors
are trading against the bubble or shorting. Of course, a strict interpretation of shorting
requires that investor hold a negative position. We choose a somewhat more conservative
interpretation because investors might hold a certain amount of the asset for diversification
purposes. The third alternative is that the change in risk after positive bubble signals
outweighs the change in the expected return. In this case, risk-averse investors might
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refrain from changing their allocation, and we then conclude that investors are sidelining.
3.1 Derivation of the Optimal Portfolio
We consider an investor who can allocate her wealth W at the end of month t between
a single risky asset, which is the typical industry, and a risk-free asset. The investor can
hedge systematic risk factors in industry returns. This approach allows us to isolate the
impact of the bubble signal on the optimal asset allocation from the impact of systematic
determinants of industry returns. The portfolio return rp,t+1 in month t + 1 obeys:
rp,t+1 = wrt+1 − wβ′ft+1 + (1− w)rf,t+1 = rf,t+1 + wηt+1 (4)
where w is the fraction of wealth invested in the industry, and ηt+1 is its abnormal return.
We set the risk-free rate equal to its long-run average of 30.5 basis points per month (3.67%
per year).
The investor’s preferences over wealth are described by a power-utility function:
U(W ) =
W 1−γ − 1
1− γ γ 6= 1,W > 0 (5)
where γ is the coefficient of risk aversion. For W ≤ 0, the investor is bankrupt, and
we set the utility to −∞. Based on Equation (4), the next period’s wealth is given by
Wt+1 = Wt(1 + rf,t+1 + wηt+1). The investor infers the bubble signal Bt at the end of
month t as in Subsection 1.2 and solves for the optimal weight:
max
w
E
[ (
Wt (1 + rf,t+1 + wηt+1)
)(1−γ)
1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣Bt
]
(6)
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that results in the first-order condition:
E
[
(1 + rf,t+1 + w
∗ηt+1)
−γηt+1
∣∣Bt] = 0. (7)
Because the optimal weight can differ depending on the bubble signal, we use wB to
denote the optimal weight for positive bubble signals and wNB for negative bubble sig-
nals. Similarly, we define the value functions VB ≡ E[U(1 + rf,t+1 + wBηt+1|Bt = 1] and
VNB ≡ E[U(1 + rf,t+1 + wNBηt+1|Bt = 0].
To determine the economic significance of trading on bubble information, we compute
the certainty equivalent return. We calculate the risk-free return that the investor requires
as compensation for not changing her portfolio when she receives a positive bubble signal.
The certainty equivalent return λ satisfies the condition:
E[U(1 + rf,t+1 + wBηt+1|Bt = 1] = E[U(1 + rf,t+1 + wNBηt+1 + λ|Bt = 1]. (8)
Table 6 shows that the optimal weight increases substantially when an investor receives
a positive bubble signal. For an investor with a moderate risk-aversion level of two, the
weight rises from 0.08 to 1.70 for abnormal returns based on the CAPM. For the Fama-
French and Carhart models the optimal weight rises from zero to 0.93, and from 0.12 to 0.91
respectively.6 The standard errors in the parentheses indicate that the weight allocated
to the risky asset in the absence of a positive bubble signal is indistinguishable from zero.
6In the case of the CAPM, the investor takes a levered position that can theoretically lead to negative
wealth with a non-zero probability. We find a levered position to be optimal, because the optimization is
based on the empirical distribution. Including the possibility of extreme negative returns would lead to a
maximum investment of one. For higher degrees of risk aversion, allocations do not change.
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When the investor gets a positive bubble signal, it becomes significantly positive. The p-
values in the last column show that the difference in weight is statistically significant at the
5% level for all specifications. As in Table 4, we derive the p-values from a bootstrap under
the null hypothesis that the weights are equal for positive and negative bubble signals.
[Table 6 about here.]
We investigate how the change in optimal weight is affected by different risk-aversion
levels. Even for rather high levels of risk aversion, the difference in portfolio weights
is economically significant. For the most conservative estimate, which we base on the
Carhart model with a risk-aversion level of ten, the optimal weight increases ninefold. The
approximation E[(1+rf+w
∗ηi)
−γηi] ≈ E[exp (−γ(rf + w∗ηi))ηi] for the first-order condition
in Equation (7) shows that a multiplication of γ with a constant requires a division of w∗
by the same factor to maintain optimality. Therefore, the p-values depend very little on
the level of risk aversion. To test wB = wNB, we construct a series of portfolio differences
based on a bootstrap. Because both weights are approximately inversely related to risk
aversion, the same holds for the difference, and the test is only marginally affected.
In line with our results for the optimal weight, we find that riding bubbles is associated
with significant increases in expected utility. We report the ratio of utilities VB/VNB. For
an investor with a risk aversion of γ = 2, the ratios of expected utility values are 1.63 for
the Carhart model and 9.25 for the CAPM.
Investors require a sizable compensation for not updating their portfolio when they
obtain a positive bubble signal. For the CAPM, the investor requires a risk-free return
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of 7.38% annually. The certainty equivalent returns for the Fama-French and Carhart
models are 2.43% and 1.76% respectively for an investor with a risk-aversion level of two.
As risk aversion decreases, the certainty equivalent increases. The certainty equivalent
is significantly positive across all the different specifications, as the p-values in the last
column show.
Our results show strong support for the riding bubbles hypothesis. Increases in portfolio
weights are statistically and economically significant and the certainty equivalent returns
for a bubble riding strategy are non-trivial.
4 Bubble Episodes: Scrutinizing our Bubble Detec-
tion Method
Based on the positive bubble signals we derive in Subsection 1.2, we construct historical
bubble episodes to see whether they look reasonable and match anecdotal evidence. If
the investor receives a positive signal at t (Bi,t = 1) and the observation is between t and
the breakpoint t − ζ∗, then we classify an observation as belonging to a bubble. As long
as the sequence of bubble observations is not interrupted, we count these observations as
belonging to the same bubble. Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for these bubbles. The
mean and median number of bubbles per industry is close to three. The raw and abnormal
returns during bubbles are economically large. The standardized abnormal returns during
bubbles are 0.49, 0.51, and 0.52 per month for the CAPM, the Fama-French, and Carhart
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model, respectively. The average idiosyncratic volatility ranges from 4.17% for the CAPM
to 3.86% for the Fama-French model and 3.81% for the Carhart model. If we assume
an average idiosyncratic return volatility of 4%, then these returns translate into annual
abnormal returns of about 23%. We also find that the residual volatility of the standardized
abnormal returns is substantially larger than one. Although our method of deriving signals
is based on abnormal returns, for illustrative purposes we compute the raw returns during
the bubbles. The raw return of the average industry during a bubble ranges from 30.2%
for the CAPM to 31.4% for the Fama-French model and 31.0% for the Carhart model.
[Table 7 about here.]
Figure 3 displays the number of bubbles over time. For all three asset pricing models,
we find that the three highest spikes coincide with the famous historical bubbles over the
last century. The largest increase in the number of industries that experience a bubble
is during the well-known internet bubble in the mid- to late 90s that started deflating
in 2000. We also observe a large increase in the number of bubble industries during the
“Bubble in Concept Stocks” as termed by Malkiel (1996). According to Baker and Wurgler
(2006) this “major bubble” developed in 1967 to 1968. Malkiel (1996) notes that during
this time period people believed the best strategy was to buy “stocks with an exciting
concept or compelling story” that had either recently experienced strong earnings growth
or were expected to do so in the near future. Because this bubble ended with the bear
market of 1969 to 1971 (see, Malkiel, 1996, p. 76), the graph documents a sharp decrease
in the number of industries experiencing the bubble. The graph shows a third major spike
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in the number of bubble industries during the first bubble period report by Baker and
Wurgler (2006). Malkiel (1996) calls it the “tronics boom” and dates it to 1959 to 1961.
Besides these famous historical bubbles, we observe many less pronounced bubble periods
in the graph. To investigate more systematically the nature of these bubbles, we proceed
along two lines. First, using simulations, we formally investigate how many bubbles can
potentially be attributed to noise or a general misspecification of an asset pricing model.
Second, in Subsection 4.2, we investigate whether the bubbles we find correlate well with
other proxies for mispricing.
[Figure 3 about here.]
4.1 Bubbles, Signals, Noise, and Misspecification
How many bubbles and bubble signals can potentially be attributed to noise or a mis-
specification of the asset pricing models?7 Because our method is a real-time detection
system, and spotting bubbles in real time is not easy, we expect that the method is rather
noisy. In our case, a noisy method makes us err on the side of caution: signals that can
be attributed to noise or a misspecification are not followed by the risk-return trade-off
documented in previous sections. Instead, there is–by definition–no difference between the
return distributions following the positive or negative signals that are attributable to noise
or a misspecification (see Appendix C).
7We investigate the effect of more closely defined misspecifications such as an omitted risk factor and
an omitted structural break in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
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We set up two simulation studies for which we construct pseudo samples by a bootstrap
based on the original data as in Kosowski et al. (2006). In the first study, we focus on
the effect of noise. The pseudo industry returns consist of factor realizations and an
idiosyncratic part that has by construction a zero mean. For the idiosyncratic part, we
bootstrap from the industry returns where both the factor exposure and the mean have
been removed. In the second study, we do not impose that the idiosyncratic part has a zero
mean, and we bootstrap directly from the industry returns after removing their risk-factor
exposures. In both cases, we apply a temporal bootstrap. More formal mathematical
explanations and detailed results of the simulation studies are in Appendix C.
We compare the percentage of our sample classified as bubbles or positive bubble signals
for the two types of simulations and the real data. In the simulations, the fraction of the
sample classified as positive bubble signals is between 1.73% and 1.81%. Comparing the
fraction of positive signals in the simulations to the fraction of positive signals in the real
data shows that we find about twice as many positive bubble signals in the real data for
the Fama-French and Carhart models, and three times as many for the CAPM. Similarly,
we find about 1.8 to 1.9 bubbles in the simulated data. So, around half to two-thirds of
the bubbles in the real data can potentially be attributed to noise or misspecifications.
This evidence shows that our method of extracting signals is very noisy. Many of the
less pronounced bubble periods in Figure 3 might be at least partially attributable to noise.
It is striking that despite the fact that our method is relatively noisy, our results on the
returns following positive versus negative bubble signals are economically and statistically
very strong. If such a basic and noisy method leads to the strong conclusion that riding
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bubbles is optimal, then it comes at no surprise that Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) show
that hedge-fund managers were able to profit from riding the internet bubble. Arguably,
hedge-fund managers have a much better information set and thus more precise signals.
4.2 Bubbles and Sentiment
Based on Baker and Wurgler (2007), we hypothesize that the number of industries expe-
riencing a bubble should be positively correlated with investor sentiment. Further, based
on the cross-sectional findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), we propose that more
speculative growth industries such as telecommunications or biotech are more likely to
experience a bubble when sentiment is high. In turn, safe, more traditional, and asset in-
tensive industries have a higher probability of experiencing bubbles if sentiment is low, for
example, in periods such as the “Nifty-Fifties.” Representative industries that belong to
this category are raw materials, for example, gold, steel, or coal; or industries like utilities
and transportation.
We use the sentiment index SENTIMENT⊥ from Jeffrey Wurgler’s homepage for
1964 to 2007.8 For robustness we also use the Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) of the
University of Michigan (see Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006, for more information). As
a crude, though for all industries readily available measure for speculative versus safety,
we use the book-to-market ratio (BE/ME). If sentiment is high, then industries with
low BE/ME ratios are more likely to experience bubbles. To the contrary, if sentiment
is low, then high BE/ME ratios have a higher probability of experiencing a bubble. To
8http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/
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test this hypothesis, we first compute the difference in the BE/ME ratio of the portfolio
of industries that experiences a bubble versus the portfolio of industries that does not
experience a bubble. Second, we compute the correlation with SENTIMENT⊥. We do
not repeat this analysis for the CCI because Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) point out
that the CCI does not relate to the value premium.
Table 8 shows the correlation coefficient between the monthly Baker and Wurgler (2007)
sentiment index and the number of bubbles we identify for a given month. For the CAPM-
based bubbles, the correlation is 0.17 and not statistically significant. However, for the
bubbles identified using the Fama-French and Carhart models, the correlation is much
larger at 0.46 and highly significant. The same pattern emerges if we use the CCI as a
proxy for investor sentiment. In line with our expectations, we also observe a significantly
negative correlation between the sentiment indicator and the difference in the BE/ME
ratios. Indeed, in times of high sentiment, industries with low BE/ME ratios are more
likely to experience a bubble; but in times of low sentiment, industries with high BE/ME
ratios are more likely to be in a bubble. These findings confirm that the bubbles we find
are not specific to our analysis. On an aggregate level as well as in the cross-section, we
find that these bubbles are related to investor sentiment.
[Table 8 about here.]
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5 Alternative Explanations
Our results are consistent with the riding bubbles hypothesis put forward by De Long
et al. (1990b) and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003). In this section, we investigate whether
alternative explanations can also explain our findings.
5.1 Industry Momentum
One alternative explanation is buy-side industry momentum (i.e., the “winner” portfolio)
as identified by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). Just like a bubble, buy-side industry mo-
mentum is associated with an upward trend in prices. When comparing buy-side industry
momentum with the positive bubble signals, one difference that becomes apparent is the
timing of both phenomena. Table 2 shows that the average length of a positive bubble
signal is about 30 months. Over this time interval, buy-side industry momentum actually
reverses and profits become negative. This finding accords with Fama and French (1988),
who report a negative autocorrelation for industry returns at similar horizons. This nega-
tive correlation contrasts with our finding of positive abnormal returns following positive
bubble signals.
We examine the relation between positive bubble signals and industry momentum more
formally along two lines. First, we investigate whether using an industry momentum factor
instead ofMOM affects our results. Using the Carhart (1997) factor might not be sufficient
to explain return momentum in an industry portfolio because stock momentum does not
subsume industry momentum (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). Second, we double-sort
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the sample of industries on the buy-side momentum and the positive bubble signals. If
buy-side industry momentum can explain the effect of a positive bubble signal on the
distribution of abnormal returns, then the effect should be less strong or absent if we find
a positive bubble signal but the industry does not experience buy-side momentum.
We construct industry momentum portfolios based on our sample of 48 industry port-
folios. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) use 20 industry portfolios in their study. They al-
locate the top (bottom) three industries to the winner (loser) portfolio, which corresponds
to 15% of their sample. For our sample, 15% translates into including the top (bottom)
seven (48× 0.15 ≈ 7) industries in the winner (loser) portfolio. Following Moskowitz and
Grinblatt (1999), we construct a six-month, six-month momentum factor with a one-month
lag. Since we require a minimum length of 12 months for the positive bubble signals, we
additionally build a momentum portfolio based on a 12-month ranking period, a one-month
lag, and an investment during the following month.
We replace the Carhart (1997) momentum factor in Equations (1) and (3) with one of
the two industry momentum factors. Table 9 shows that our findings for the risk-return
trade-off do not change substantially. They are similar to the results for the conventional
Carhart model presented throughout this paper. The mean and median abnormal returns
after a positive bubble are significantly larger than after a negative signal. Volatility and
downside risk are also higher after a positive signal.
[Table 9 about here.]
To provide further corroborating evidence, we double-sort the industries on positive
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bubble signals and buy-side momentum. We focus again on two strategies. First, in line
with our approach above, we use a 12-month ranking period, an one-month lag, and an
one-month holding period. Second, we again use a six-month ranking period and an one-
month lag. However, we deviate slightly from our previous setting and Moskowitz and
Grinblatt (1999) by using a one-month holding period to be consistent with the returns we
report for the positive bubble signals. This modification should not affect our results as
the buy-side momentum effect is even larger in magnitude for a one-month holding period
than for a six-month holding period (see Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, Table 3, p. 1270).
In Table 10 we compare distributional characteristics of the abnormal returns of the two
different buy-side momentum strategies to the positive bubble signal. As usual, we display
the results for the three different asset pricing models in panels. In the first column of each
panel, we show the abnormal returns of the industries that experience buy-side momentum
and for which we have a positive bubble signal at the same time. In most instances, the
risk-return pattern is relatively similar to the one in Table 4 for the complete sample
of positive bubble signals. In one case, Panel C, the abnormal return is small and not
statistically significant. However, column two shows that the abnormal return becomes
significantly positive if we look at industries with a positive bubble signal that do not
experience momentum.
[Table 10 about here.]
To formally analyze whether buy-side momentum causes the positive abnormal returns
and higher risk of the bubble strategy, we conduct a one-sided test on whether the abnormal
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returns and risk measures in column one are larger than in column two. If we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the distributional characteristics of the abnormal returns following a
positive bubble signal are identical in the absence or presence of buy-side momentum, then
we can conclude that buy-side momentum is not driving our findings. For the average and
median abnormal returns none of the p-values are close to conventional levels of significance.
Thus, we can safely conclude that momentum is not driving the positive returns of the
bubble strategy. For the risk measures, we can also generally conclude that our findings
are not driven by industry momentum. Only in one instance do we find that the volatility
is larger if there is also momentum (Panel C). However, that instance is before we account
for stock-return momentum. The results for the Carhart model show that the p-value goes
up to 0.50. We also display the distributional characteristics of the abnormal returns of the
momentum strategy in the absence of a positive bubble signal (column 3). Although not
the main point of this paper, an interesting observation is that a momentum strategy is
more profitable if there is a positive bubble signal (though the difference is not statistically
significant). A bubble strategy tends to be more profitable than a momentum strategy.
5.2 Good News Reported in the Media
Another potential explanation for our findings is good news reported in the media. Chan
(2003) analyzes the stock-market reaction to news releases and finds that it is limited to a
couple of months. Thus, the reaction to a single positive news item is much shorter than
the minimum length of the positive bubble signals. However, perhaps there is a stream of
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good news that, especially if the market underreacts to the new information, might cause
a prolonged period of positive abnormal returns. We call this phenomenon a “rally.”
Although it is not possible to distinguish between bubbles and rallies ex ante, we can
expect a different pattern ex post. During a rally, the asset is initially undervalued and
the price rises to become equal to its fundamental value. Once the asset is no longer
substantially undervalued, abnormal returns should, on average, be close to zero. For
bubbles, the opposite should hold. The asset is overvalued and the price will ultimately
return to its fundamental value.
To examine whether rallies are a feasible explanation for our findings, we investigate
the returns following bubbles constructed from positive signals as in Section 4. Figure 4
presents the monthly abnormal returns for two years after a bubble. For all three asset
pricing models, we observe a large negative return in the first month after the bubble.
Because bubbles end with crashes, this finding is not surprising. After the initial very
negative return we see a continuous price deflation over the next one to two years. Twelve
months after the end of a bubble, the cumulative abnormal returns are -11.9% for the
CAPM, -10.14% for the Fama-French model, and -9.06% for the Carhart model. During
the second year, the decline slows down. Two years after a bubble, the cumulative abnormal
returns are -14.77% for the CAPM, -13.45% for the Fama-French model, and -10.82% for
the Carhart model. Overall, we conclude that on average, returns following bubbles are
very negative. We cannot rule out that not a single one of the bubbles we identify is truly
a rally, but this finding indicates that the bubbles are generally distinct from rallies.
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[Figure 4 about here.]
5.3 Structural Breaks in Risk Factors
Another explanation for our results could be that the asset pricing model is misspecified
because we do not account for structural breaks in the risk factors. An omitted structural
break in any of the risk-factor exposures could translate into an estimated structural break
in the intercept. We might wrongly classify these structural breaks as positive bubble
signals. In such a scenario, one could attribute the positive abnormal returns after positive
signals to the higher systematic risk not captured by the asset pricing model.
We investigate whether such a scenario is a plausible alternative explanation for our
findings. We formally derive the effect of latent structural breaks in the risk-factor co-
efficients on our method to derive bubble signals and estimate the relevant parameters
from our sample. We conclude that a structural break in any of the risk-factor exposures
must be implausibly large to lead to a misspecification as a positive bubble signal. Dur-
ing our sample period, we do not observe any changes in exposures of the size needed for
misspecification.
First, we derive the effect of a structural break in any of the risk-factor coefficients on
our method to detect bubble signals. We assume that the following expected return model
is the true model at time t:
ri,t−τ = αi,t+βi,t,τf1,t−τ+γ
′
i,tf˜t−τ+εi,t,τ , E[εi,t,τ ] = 0, E[ε
2
i,t,τ ] = σ
2
i,t, τ = 0, 1, . . . , T−1, (9)
over the past T months. The vector f˜t contains the other risk factors. We assume that a
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structural break in the coefficient for the first risk factor is present:
βi,t,τ =


βai,t for τ = ζ + 1, ζ + 2, T − 1
βpi,t for τ = 0, 1, . . . , ζ,
(10)
where ζL ≤ ζ ≤ ζU . This model can be extended to any number of risk factors (see
Appendix D).
To derive bubble signals, we carry out the steps of Subsection 1.2 and estimate the
misspecified model:
ri,t−τ = ai,t,τ + bi,tf1,t−τ + c
′
i,tf˜t−τ + ei,t,τ , E[ei,t,τ ] = 0, E[ei,t,τ ] = σ
2
e,i,t, τ = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
ai,t,τ =


aai,t for τ = ζ + 1, ζ + 2, . . . , T − 1
api,t for τ = 0, 1, . . . , ζ
(11)
and test for a break in ai,t,τ . To distinguish the estimated misspecified model from the
true model, we use Latin letters for the estimated model. In Appendix D.1 we analyze the
consequences of misspecification in the asymptotic framework of Andrews (1993) in which
the number of observations goes to infinity, but the fraction of observations before and
after the break stays constant. We show that this misspecification leads to a bias in the
difference between the estimates aˆai,t and aˆ
p
i,t with the asymptotic value:
plimT→∞(aˆ
p
i,t − aˆai,t) = (βpi,t − βai,t) E[f1]. (12)
Assuming a positive structural break in the risk-factor exposure, βpi,t > β
a
i,t, and E[f1] > 0,
the asymptotic bias is positive.
38
An omitted structural break not only affects the asymptotic value of the difference in
intercepts, but also the variance:
TVar[aˆpi,t − aˆai,t]→ (βpi,t − βai,t)2Var[f1] +
1
ξ(1− ξ)σ
2
i,t, (13)
where ξ = (T − ζ − 1)/T is the fraction of observations before the structural break. An
omitted structural break in the risk-factor coefficients biases the variance upwards.
The test statistic for the structural break in the intercept is the ratio of the difference
between aˆai,t and aˆ
p
i,t to the variance of this difference. Using Equations (12) and (13), its
bias is:
χSBF =
√
T (βpi,t − βai,t) E[f1]√
(βpi,t − βai,t)2Var[f1] + 1ξ(1−ξ)σ2i,t
. (14)
Equation (14) shows that both the numerator and the denominator of this t-statistic in-
crease because of the misspecification. Because the increases in the numerator and the
denominator depend on the expected value E[f1] and the variance Var[f1] of the risk fac-
tor, the combined effect is an empirical question.
We compute the long-run average and variance of each risk factor. To determine the
range of interest, we determine the largest increases in the factor exposures over a period
of ten years for all industries based on the Carhart model. We find maximal increases of
1.16 in the exposure to the market return, 2.7 for SMB, 2.16 for HML, and 1.31 for MOM.
Then we compute the resulting test statistic for structural breaks of a varying size. We
assume that the structural break is located exactly in the middle of the test period (i.e.,
ξ = 1/2) because the bias is maximized for this setting (see Appendix D.1). We set the
residual variance equal to the overall average of 4%.
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Figure 5(a) shows the bias in the χ statistic as a function of the true structural break
size in βi,t. The solid line corresponds to the case in which the structural break is in the
exposure to the market factor. We observe that the bias in χ increases if the true structural
break becomes larger. For a break in the CAPM-β of 0.5, the bias equals 0.40. If the break
becomes larger, for example one, then the bias rises to 0.69. For a confidence level of 97.5%,
the critical value given by Andrews (1993) is 2.82. Even for improbably large structural
breaks exceeding two, the bias in χ is well below this value. We also display the bias for
the other factors. The bias due to breaks in the exposure to the size factor SMB or value
factor HML are well below those for the market return. A break in the exposure to MOM
can have a larger effect, but this bias is also well below the critical value of 2.82.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The long-run average might understate the potential bias. We repeat the analysis using
the largest ten-year average of each risk factor in our sample. Figure 5(b) shows the relation
between bias and the true structural break size for this subset. A break in the exposure to
the market return produces the largest bias. Over the period of July 1949 to June 1959,
the average market return equals 1.46% per month with a volatility of only 3.21%. If the
structural break in the CAPM-β is 0.5, then the bias is 0.98. For a break of one, the bias
is 1.87. Only for implausibly large breaks exceeding 1.75 does the bias exceed the critical
value of 2.82.
Based on this analysis, we conclude that our method is very unlikely to identify a
positive bubble signal when an industry is actually exhibiting a structural change in its
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exposure to a risk factor. Even when we choose the parameter values such that the effect
of misspecification is the worst case, we need an unrealistically large structural break in
the factor exposure to surpass the critical values. We conclude that structural breaks in
factor exposures do not qualify as an alternative explanation for our findings.
5.4 Omitted Risk Factors
We investigate whether the positive bubble signals could be an omitted risk factor. In such
a scenario, the positive abnormal returns following the positive signals might truly be a
compensation for the omitted risk factor. We derive the effect of an omitted risk factor in
Appendix D.2. In this subsection we discuss the main results.
The true underlying model is similar to Equation (9):
ri,t−τ = αi,t+βi,t,τf1,t−τ+γi,tf2,t−τ+εi,t,τ , E[εi,tτ ] = 0, E[ε
2
i,tτ ] = σ
2
i,t τ = 0, 1, . . . , T−1.
(15)
We assume without loss of generality that the model contains two factors and that the first
factor is omitted in the estimation. The exposure to this factor might be constant, that is,
βi,t,τ = βi,t; or show a structural break as in Equation (10). Instead of the true model, we
omit the first factor and estimate the following model:
ri,t−τ = ai,tτ + ci,tf2,τ + ei,t,τ , E[ei,t,τ ] = 0 E[ei,t,τ ] = σ
2
e,i,t, τ = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
ai,t,τ =


aai,t for τ = ζ + 1, ζ + 2, . . . , T − 1
api,t for τ = 0, 1, . . . , ζ.
.
(16)
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Again, we look at the bias of the test statistic for structural break in the intercept. In
Appendix D.2 we derive the asymptotic difference between the estimates a˜ai,t and a˜
p
i,t:
plimT→∞ a˜
p
i,t − a˜ai,t = (βpi,t − βai,t) E[f1]. (17)
This expression is equal to our result in the previous subsection that shows that the asymp-
totic bias in the difference is the product of the size of the structural break and the average
of the omitted factor. This expression shows that an omitted factor influences the struc-
tural break test only if the asset exhibits a structural break in its exposure towards this
factor. If an omitted factor does not show a structural break, then the effect on the con-
stant is the same for a˜ai,t and a˜
p
i,t; and the effects cancel out when we take the difference.
Therefore, a constant exposure to an omitted risk factor cannot be mistaken as a positive
bubble signal.
If the omitted risk factor exhibits a structural break, then its effect on our method to
obtain bubble signals is similar to the effect of a risk factor for which we omit only the
break. The only difference is that because we need to add the error of missing out on the
factor completely, the increase in the residual variance is even larger. A larger residual
variance leads to a larger variance of the estimated difference between a˜ai,t and a˜
p
i,t. In
Appendix D.2 we prove that:
χOBF =
(βpi,t − βai,t) E[f1]
Var[a˜pi,t − a˜ai,t]
≤ (β
p
i,t − βai,t) E[f1]
Var[aˆpi,t − aˆai,t]
= χSBF. (18)
Equation (18) shows that the effect of a structural break in a factor exposure on the test
statistic is actually smaller when the factor is omitted than when it is added to the asset
pricing model. Hence, as long as the omitted factors have characteristics (i.e., means and
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variances) similar to the typical factors used in asset pricing, they cannot explain our
results.
6 Conclusion
The findings of this study contribute to explaining why bubbles persist. Because riding
bubbles is optimal, investors will not cause a bubble to burst. Instead, investors have
strong incentives to fuel bubbles and thus increase their size. From a practical perspective,
our study helps to explain the existence of sizable bubbles since the inception of financial
markets hundreds of years ago.
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Table 1: Structure of the Bubble Model
Period ∆ps ∆pi,s ∆pb,s
s ≤ s0 rf,s + β′fs + es rf,s + β′fs
s0 < s ≤ s1 rf,s + β′fs + a+ es rf,s + β′fs + a
s1 < s ≤ s2 rf,s + β′fs + a+ es rf,s + β′fs a
s2 < s ≤ s3 rf,s + β′fs + ds + es rf,s + β′fs ds
s > s3 rf,s + β
′fs + es rf,s + β
′fs
This table provides an overview of the change in the logarithm of the asset price ps, its intrinsic value pi,s,
and the bubble component pb,s for each time period. The risk-free rate is rf,s, fs is a vector of risk factors
given by an asset pricing model, and β is the corresponding vector of coefficients. The unexplained part
of the price process is represented by the error term es and the constant a.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Bubble Signals
(a) Number of Signals
CAPM Fama-French model Carhart model
Total 39,696 39,696 39,456
Positive 1,966 1,344 1,337
5.0% 3.4% 3.4%
Negative 37,730 38,352 38,119
95.0% 96.6% 96.6%
(b) Positive Bubble Signals
CAPM Fama-French model Carhart model
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
αai,t -0.0061 -0.0057 0.0053 -0.0050 -0.0045 0.0052 -0.0049 -0.0044 0.0050
αpi,t 0.023 0.020 0.012 0.022 0.019 0.012 0.021 0.019 0.012
Strength 3.21 3.14 0.780 3.15 3.04 0.779 3.11 2.99 0.707
Length 33.9 31.0 15.4 30.2 26.0 14.9 30.4 26.0 15.0
This table reports the number and fraction of bubble signals in panel A and the mean, median, and
standard deviation (SD) of several properties of the positive bubble signals in Panel B. To construct the
signals, we regress the industry returns on a constant and the market return (column titled CAPM), Fama
and French (1993)’s three-factor model (column titled Fama-French model), or Carhart (1997)’s four-factor
model (column titled Carhart model). If a ten-year series of industry returns shows evidence of an upward
structural break in the intercept, the intercept is significantly positive after the break, and there was no
crash during the past six months, then we derive a positive bubble signal. Critical values for the structural
break test correspond with a 97.5% confidence level and are obtained from Andrews (1993). We denote
the constant before the structural break by αai,t and the one after it by α
p
i,t. The strength is the t-statistic
of αpi,t. The length is the number of months since the structural break.
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Table 3: Portfolios based on Bubble Signals
(a) Portfolio descriptives, excess and abnormal returns
CAPM Fama-French model Carhart model
Bubble No-bubble Bubble No-bubble Bubble No-bubble
Portfolio descriptives
Months with signals 69% 100% 64% 100% 64% 100%
Average No. of Industries 3.25 42.78 2.40 43.48 2.40 43.52
Std. Dev. of No. of Industries 2.64 3.69 1.49 3.26 1.51 3.25
Average Portfolio Turnover 1.79 0.16 1.45 0.13 1.45 0.13
Raw return
Average return 1.70% 1.01% 1.44% 1.02% 1.57% 1.00%
Volatility 6.40% 4.92% 6.27% 4.93% 6.25% 4.93%
Abnormal return
Average abnormal return 0.76% 0.06% 0.27% 0.02% 0.34% 0.04%
Abnormal return volatility 4.26% 1.24% 3.96% 0.91% 3.77% 0.88%
Information Ratio 0.178 0.044 0.067 0.017 0.090 0.043
VaR(0.95) -5.12% -1.70% -5.85% -1.25% -5.29% -1.20%
ES(0.95) -6.87% -2.61% -8.15% -2.11% -7.59% -1.96%
(b) Tests on equality of average abnormal returns
CAPM Fama-French model Carhart model
Bubble No-bubble Bubble No-bubble Bubble No-bubble
Average, WLS 0.58% -0.01% 0.39% 0.00% 0.39% 0.01%
(0.12) (0.04) (0.12) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03)
Test, WLS 4.67 3.23 3.13
[< 0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Average, GLS 0.44% -0.01% 0.32% -0.01% 0.34% 0.01%
(0.12) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) (0.03)
Test, GLS 3.92 2.69 2.70
[< 0.001] [0.007] [0.007]
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the bubble portfolio (Bubble) and the no-bubble portfolio
(No-bubble) in Panel A. For every month t+1, we form two portfolios based on the signal we receive at the
end of month t. The no-bubble portfolio (bubble portfolio) comprises the industries for which we receive
a negative (positive) bubble signal. If there is no positive signal, then the bubble portfolio is not invested.
The table shows the average number of industries in each portfolio per month and its standard deviation,
and the percentage of months for which each portfolio is invested. We calculate the average turnover of the
portfolios as the average absolute change in portfolio weights. We report the average excess return and its
volatility per month. The Sharpe ratio is annualized. The average monthly abnormal returns are corrected
for the risk-factor exposures of the industries as in Equation (3). The information ratio is calculated as
the ratio of the average abnormal returns and their standard deviation. The realized value-at-risk (VaR)
and expected shortfall (ES) are for a confidence level of 95% and based on the abnormal returns. Panel B
reports the results of testing for the equality of the average abnormal returns of the bubble and no-bubble
portfolios. We address heteroscedasticity in the portfolio returns by estimating the averages by WLS and
(feasible) GLS regressions. We use the variance and covariance of the residuals of Equation (1) to estimate
the variance of the portfolios’ abnormal returns. Standard errors are in parentheses. The rows labeled test
report the t-statistic for the equality of abnormal returns with p-values below in brackets.
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Table 4: Standardized Abnormal Returns Following Positive and Negative Bubble
Signals
(a) CAPM
Signal Negative Positive p-value
mean 0.007 (0.010) 0.19 (0.038) < 0.0001
median −0.012 (0.008) 0.15 (0.043) < 0.0001
volatility 1.04 (0.016) 1.18 (0.032) < 0.0001
skewness 0.19 (0.073) 0.49 (0.20) 0.077
kurtosis 5.75 (0.35) 5.38 (1.30) 0.53
VaR(0.95) 1.61 (0.027) 1.69 (0.066) 0.10
ES(0.95) 2.25 (0.052) 2.18 (0.083) 0.77
VaR(0.975) 2.04 (0.043) 2.07 (0.091) 0.34
ES(0.975) 2.70 (0.074) 2.52 (0.10) 0.90
(b) Fama-French model
Signal Negative Positive p-value
mean 0.002 (0.008) 0.11 (0.043) < 0.0001
median −0.022 (0.008) 0.068 (0.036) 0.0017
volatility 1.07 (0.015) 1.26 (0.031) < 0.0001
skewness 0.21 (0.069) 0.11 (0.097) 0.66
kurtosis 5.87 (0.37) 3.83 (0.19) 0.98
VaR(0.95) 1.66 (0.026) 1.86 (0.085) 0.0033
ES(0.95) 2.29 (0.048) 2.57 (0.12) 0.0098
VaR(0.975) 2.06 (0.036) 2.34 (0.17) 0.010
ES(0.975) 2.74 (0.070) 3.08 (0.16) 0.026
(c) Carhart model
Signal Negative Positive p-value
mean 0.011 (0.008) 0.11 (0.043) < 0.0001
median −0.015 (0.008) 0.083 (0.039) 0.0008
volatility 1.08 (0.014) 1.28 (0.032) < 0.0001
skewness 0.21 (0.058) 0.095 (0.10) 0.69
kurtosis 5.69 (0.33) 3.76 (0.19) 0.99
VaR(0.95) 1.67 (0.027) 1.90 (0.086) 0.0019
ES(0.95) 2.30 (0.044) 2.59 (0.13) 0.0070
VaR(0.975) 2.08 (0.037) 2.34 (0.12) 0.016
ES(0.975) 2.75 (0.064) 3.07 (0.19) 0.028
This table reports the summary statistics and downside risk measures for the pooled set of standardized
abnormal returns at time t + 1, conditional on the bubble signal at time t being negative or positive.
The abnormal returns are based on rolling regressions of the CAPM (Panel A), the Fama-French model
(Panel B), or the Carhart model (Panel C) in Equation (1) with a 120-month estimation window. For each
regression, we construct an abnormal return for the period after the estimation window as in Equation (3).
To correct for time-varying volatility, we divide the abnormal return by the residual volatility of the
regression model. For each statistic, we compute standard errors and p-values based on 10,000 temporal
bootstraps. The column titled p-value reports the results of tests for the equality of the statistics for the
cases positive and negative bubble signal under the null hypothesis of no distributional difference.
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Table 5: Sequences of Positive Bubble Signals
Series CAPM Fama-French model Carhart model
duration # series average last crash # series average last crash # series average last crash
1 94 −0.86 −0.86 11 109 −1.12 −1.12 18 116 −1.10 −1.10 20
2 42 −0.22 −0.87 5 42 −0.25 −0.93 5 57 −0.36 −1.18 8
3 35 −0.07 −1.26 8 33 −0.10 −1.36 8 26 −0.02 −1.02 3
4 28 0.25 −1.07 4 20 0.04 −1.24 3 13 0.06 −1.30 2
5 18 0.20 −1.36 2 26 0.14 −1.34 6 17 0.24 −1.21 2
6 20 0.24 −1.55 7 11 0.21 −1.01 2 14 0.45 −1.30 5
7 18 0.27 −1.26 3 6 0.42 −1.26 2 9 0.12 −0.96 2
8 9 0.22 −1.64 3 3 0.05 −1.67 1 11 0.06 −1.08 1
9 6 0.33 −1.54 1 9 0.32 −1.17 0 6 0.33 −1.31 1
10 13 0.31 −1.49 3 5 0.32 −2.17 3 9 0.34 −1.72 3
11 3 0.26 −1.97 2 8 0.27 −1.03 3 5 0.27 −1.34 3
12 6 0.16 −1.36 2 6 0.30 −0.93 1 4 0.38 −1.72 1
13-18 13 0.49 −1.21 2 10 0.38 −1.29 2 11 0.38 −1.31 3
19-24 6 0.20 −1.44 2 9 0.30 −1.53 3 6 0.51 −1.63 2
> 24 15 0.29 −0.66 1 3 0.60 0.28 0 4 0.33 −1.55 1
total 326 0.19 −1.11 56 300 0.11 −1.17 57 308 0.11 −1.18 57
This table shows the number of series of different durations, their length, their monthly average standardized abnormal returns, their average
standardized abnormal returns of the last month of the series, and the number of crashes during the last month of the series (standardized
abnormal return below -2).
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Table 6: Optimal Portfolio Choice and Expected Utility
(a) CAPM
γ wNB wB p-value VB/VNB p-value λ p-value
0.5 0.32 (0.46) 6.05 (0.77) < 0.0001 9.35 < 0.0001 28.36 < 0.0001
1 0.16 (0.23) 3.35 (0.65) < 0.0001 5.35 < 0.0001 14.73 < 0.0001
2 0.08 (0.12) 1.70 (0.35) < 0.0001 3.18 < 0.0001 7.38 < 0.0001
3 0.05 (0.08) 1.14 (0.23) < 0.0001 2.45 < 0.0001 4.91 < 0.0001
5 0.03 (0.05) 0.68 (0.14) < 0.0001 1.87 < 0.0001 2.94 < 0.0001
10 0.02 (0.02) 0.34 (0.07) < 0.0001 1.43 < 0.0001 1.47 < 0.0001
(b) Fama-French model
γ wNB wB p-value VB/VNB p-value λ p-value
0.5 0.00 (0.39) 3.56 (1.19) 0.0034 3.60 0.0014 9.56 0.0008
1 0.00 (0.19) 1.84 (0.68) 0.0029 2.32 0.0014 4.84 0.0008
2 0.00 (0.10) 0.93 (0.35) 0.0030 1.66 0.0014 2.43 0.0008
3 0.00 (0.06) 0.62 (0.23) 0.0030 1.44 0.0014 1.62 0.0008
5 0.00 (0.04) 0.37 (0.14) 0.0030 1.26 0.0015 0.98 0.0008
10 0.00 (0.02) 0.19 (0.07) 0.0031 1.13 0.0015 0.49 0.0008
(c) Carhart model
γ wNB wB p-value VB/VNB p-value λ p-value
0.5 0.50 (0.37) 3.50 (1.18) 0.011 3.42 0.0034 6.90 0.0061
1 0.25 (0.19) 1.81 (0.68) 0.011 2.24 0.0035 3.51 0.0060
2 0.12 (0.09) 0.91 (0.35) 0.010 1.63 0.0035 1.76 0.0060
3 0.08 (0.06) 0.61 (0.24) 0.010 1.42 0.0035 1.18 0.0060
5 0.05 (0.04) 0.36 (0.14) 0.010 1.25 0.0035 0.71 0.0061
10 0.02 (0.02) 0.18 (0.07) 0.010 1.12 0.0035 0.35 0.0061
This table reports the optimal portfolio wNB (wB) of a rational investor if she receives a negative (positive)
bubble signal. Abnormal returns are based on the CAPM and the Fama-French and Carhart models. We
assume that the investor has a power-utility function. We report optimal portfolios for varying levels of
relative risk aversion γ for both cases. The investment opportunity is the typical industry with idiosyncratic
volatilities equal to their pooled averages (CAPM, 4.17%; Fama-French model, 3.86%; and Carhart model,
3.81%). The risk-free rate equals its long-term average of 0.305% per month. We report the optimal
portfolios as fractions of wealth. Based on the optimal portfolios, we calculate the ratio of expected
utilities VB/VNB. We also calculate the certainty equivalent return λ that an investor requires for not
changing her portfolio from wNB to wB in % per year. We use 10,000 temporal bootstraps to calculate
standard errors (reported in parentheses) and p-values. We test wNB = wB, VB = VNB, and λ = 0 under
the null hypothesis of no difference in distribution between the cases with positive and negative bubble
signals.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Bubbles
CAPM Fama-French model Carhart model
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Bubbles per Industry 3.05 3.00 1.26 2.98 3.00 1.33 3.00 3.00 1.34
Raw Return 30.2 28.3 23.4 31.4 30.2 24.1 31.0 30.2 23.5
St. Abn. Return 0.489 0.418 1.18 0.506 0.435 1.20 0.516 0.446 1.24
This table reports the statistics on the number of bubbles per industry, their average raw return (in %
per year), and the average standardized abnormal return per month. An observation belongs to a bubble
if the investors receive a positive signal at t, that is, Bt = 1; and the observation is between t and the
breakpoint t − ζ∗. As long as the sequence of the bubble observations is not interrupted, we count them
as belonging to the same bubble. We report the mean, median, and standard deviations.
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Table 8: Correlation between Bubble Characteristics and Sentiment Indicators
Bubble Characteristic Sentiment Indicator CAPM Fama-French model Carhart model
Number of Bubbles Sentiment 0.17 (0.12) 0.46 (0.09) 0.46 (0.09)
Number of Bubbles CCI 0.16 (0.11) 0.25 (0.12) 0.31 (0.10)
Difference in BE/ME Sentiment -0.52 (0.11) -0.49 (0.08) -0.49 (0.08)
This table reports correlation coefficients between the bubble characteristics and sentiment indicators.
The variable Number of Bubbles is the number of industries that experience a bubble in a given month.
The variable Difference in BE/ME is calculated as the BE/ME ratio of the portfolio of all industries
experiencing a bubble in a given month minus the BE/ME ratio of the portfolio of the remaining industries.
Both portfolios are value weighted. The BE/ME ratios for the industries are from French’s data library.
The variable Sentiment is the orthogonalized monthly investor sentiment indicator from Baker and Wurgler
(2007), taken from Jeffrey Wurgler’s homepage. The indicator ranges from July 1965 to December 2007.
The variable CCI is the monthly Consumer Confidence Indicator of the University of Michigan, downloaded
from the FRED-database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The indicator ranges from January
1978 to December 2009. We calculate correlation coefficients for months in which at least one industry
experiences a bubble. HAC-standard errors based on Newey and West (1987) are reported in parentheses.
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Table 9: Returns after Bubble Signals with Industry Momentum Factor
(a) 6-Month Selection, 6-Month Holding
Signal Negative Positive p-value
# obs 37849 1367
mean 0.0060 (0.0083) 0.12 (0.045) < 0.001
median -0.020 (0.0077) 0.085 (0.045) < 0.001
volatility 1.08 (0.014) 1.30 (0.034) < 0.001
VaR(0.95) 1.67 (0.024) 1.96 (0.091) < 0.001
ES(0.95) 2.31 (0.044) 2.68 (0.15) 0.001
(b) 12-Month Selection, 1-Month Holding
Signal Negative Positive p-value
# obs 37890 1326
mean 0.0075 (0.0083) 0.10 (0.044) 0.002
median -0.017 (0.0079) 0.070 (0.046) 0.002
volatility 1.08 (0.014) 1.29 (0.032) < 0.001
VaR(0.95) 1.67 (0.026) 1.93 (0.075) 0.002
ES(0.95) 2.31 (0.044) 2.68 (0.13) < 0.001
This table reports the summary statistics and downside risk measures for the pooled set of standardized
abnormal returns resulting from different momentum factors in our method to obtain positive bubble
signals and compute abnormal returns. We base the abnormal returns on rolling regressions of the industry
returns on the market return, the size portfolio SMB, and the value-growth portfolio HML from Fama and
French (1993), and a momentum factor. In Panel A we construct the momentum factor of Moskowitz and
Grinblatt (1999) in which industries are ranked at time t according to their performance over the period
t−6 to t−1. The factor is based on equally weighted long positions in the seven best-performing industries
and short positions in the seven worst-performing industries. The industries stay in this portfolio for six
months, and every month we rebalance 1/6 of this portfolio. In Panel B we rank industries based on
their performance over the period t − 12 to t − 1. We construct new portfolios every month. For each
regression, we construct an abnormal return for the period after the estimation window, as in Equation (3).
To correct for time-varying volatility, we standardize the abnormal return by a division by the residual
volatility of the regression model. We split the abnormal returns according to the bubble signal. For
each statistic, we construct standard errors, which we report in parentheses, and p-values based on 1,000
temporal bootstraps. The column titled p-value reports the results of tests for equality of the statistics
based on the distribution without a bubble signal and those based on the distribution with a bubble signal
under the null hypothesis of no distributional difference between the two cases.
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Table 10: Characteristics of Abnormal Returns, Double-sorted on Positive Bubble Signals and Buy-Side Momen-
tum
(a) CAPM, 6-Month Momentum (b) CAPM, 12-Month Momentum
bubble signal positive positive negative positive positive negative
buy-side mom. yes no yes p-value yes no yes p-value
# Obs. 728 1238 5254 899 1067 5088
Average 0.186 (0.060) 0.195 (0.040) 0.054 (0.018) 0.441 0.219 (0.054) 0.169 (0.043) 0.104 (0.020) 0.209
Median 0.158 (0.084) 0.147 (0.039) 0.026 (0.020) 0.222 0.224 (0.064) 0.111 (0.042) 0.071 (0.017) 0.056
Volatility 1.28 (0.041) 1.12 (0.039) 1.04 (0.018) 0.169 1.26 (0.039) 1.12 (0.043) 1.06 (0.018) 0.229
VaR(0.95) 1.73 (0.105) 1.58 (0.098) 1.55 (0.031) 0.323 1.76 (0.096) 1.52 (0.105) 1.58 (0.041) 0.146
ES(0.95) 2.28 (0.115) 2.11 (0.097) 2.13 (0.063) 0.214 2.31 (0.118) 2.04 (0.101) 2.15 (0.061) 0.127
(c) Fama-French Model, 6-Month Momentum (d) Fama-French Model, 12-Month Momentum
bubble signal positive positive negative positive positive negative
buy-side mom. yes no yes p-value yes no yes p-value
# Obs. 582 762 5400 720 624 5267
Average 0.039 (0.067) 0.170 (0.047) 0.054 (0.017) 0.754 0.136 (0.056) 0.086 (0.056) 0.099 (0.019) 0.125
Median −0.002 (0.054) 0.131 (0.043) 0.036 (0.016) 0.792 0.083 (0.051) 0.061 (0.048) 0.076 (0.019) 0.198
Volatility 1.38 (0.047) 1.16 (0.037) 1.06 (0.018) 0.036 1.30 (0.041) 1.22 (0.045) 1.08 (0.019) 0.172
VaR(0.95) 2.11 (0.127) 1.64 (0.125) 1.58 (0.036) 0.101 1.92 (0.120) 1.83 (0.127) 1.60 (0.039) 0.333
ES(0.95) 2.84 (0.181) 2.27 (0.145) 2.15 (0.058) 0.095 2.54 (0.145) 2.60 (0.206) 2.17 (0.058) 0.650
(e) Carhart Model, 6-Month Momentum (f) Carhart Model, 12-Month Momentum
bubble signal positive positive negative positive positive negative
buy-side mom. yes no yes p-value yes no yes p-value
# Obs. 472 865 5485 614 723 5354
Average 0.077 (0.064) 0.133 (0.050) 0.080 (0.018) 0.878 0.140 (0.054) 0.091 (0.057) 0.028 (0.017) 0.483
Median 0.034 (0.061) 0.104 (0.045) 0.037 (0.016) 0.856 0.082 (0.054) 0.085 (0.050) −0.008 (0.018) 0.526
Volatility 1.27 (0.045) 1.29 (0.040) 1.09 (0.018) 0.502 1.22 (0.037) 1.33 (0.047) 1.08 (0.018) 0.871
VaR(0.95) 1.99 (0.114) 1.84 (0.105) 1.59 (0.041) 0.141 1.84 (0.101) 1.96 (0.151) 1.67 (0.048) 0.392
ES(0.95) 2.51 (0.151) 2.61 (0.166) 2.18 (0.054) 0.400 2.24 (0.096) 2.86 (0.214) 2.28 (0.057) 0.888
This table reports the summary statistics and downside risk measures for the pooled set of standardized abnormal returns. We sort returns
on whether a positive bubble signal exists in the previous month t, and on whether returns correspond with industries that are selected for a
buy-side momentum portfolio. The seven industries that perform the best over a specific past horizon constitute this portfolio. For Panels a,
c, and e, this horizon is from t − 1 to t− 6; for Panels b, d, and f, the horizon is from t − 1 to t− 12. We report standard errors based on a
temporal bootstrap in parenthesis. The final column contains p-values for a test on the equality of statistics for the combination of a positive
bubble signal and buy-side momentum (positive, yes) and the combination of a positive bubble signal and no buy-side momentum (positive,
no). The p-values correspond with the one-sided alternative that the first statistics are larger than the second statistics. We construct the
p-values by a temporal bootstrap under the null-hypothesis of equality in distribution.
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Figure 1: A Stylized Example of the Bubble Model
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This figure presents a stylized example of the bubble model. The size of the bubble is determined as the
difference between the log price of asset ps and the log fundamental or intrinsic value pi,s. Until s1, the
growth rate of the price and of the fundamental value coincide. From s1 to s2, the growth rate of the
fundamental value drops to re,s, but the asset price grows at the higher rate re,s + a. A bubble arises as
its log size grows by a. At s2, a correction sets in, and the asset price falls towards the fundamental value
at rate ds. The correction lasts until s3. In the graph, we assume pricing errors are absent.
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Figure 2: Abnormal Return of Bubble Portfolio and No-bubble Portfolio
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(a) CAPM
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(b) Fama-French model
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(c) Carhart model
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal log returns of $1 invested in the bubble portfolio (red, solid)
or the no-bubble portfolio (blue, dashed) starting in July 1936 for the CAPM and Fama-French models.
For the Carhart model, we start in January 1937. The bubble (no-bubble) portfolio is invested in every
month t + 1 in all industries for which we have a positive (negative) bubble signal at t. If there are no
positive bubble signals, then the bubble portfolio is not invested. Both portfolios are equally weighted
across industries.
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Figure 3: Number of Bubbles over Time
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(b) Fama-French Model
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(c) Carhart Model
This figure shows the evolution of the number of industries in a bubble over time for the different factor
models. An industry i encounters a bubble in month τ < t, if the investors receives a positive signal at t,
i.e., Bi,t = 1, and month τ is between t and the breakpoint t− ζ∗. We show results based on the CAPM
(panel A), the Fama-French model (panel B) and the Carhart model (panel C).
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Figure 4: Returns after Bubbles
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This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of a typical industry (in %) up to 36 months after a
bubble has ended. Based on the full time series of positive bubble signals, we construct bubbles for each
industry. The end of one bubble is the first month that is no longer classified as a positive bubble signal.
We show abnormal returns based on the CAPM (solid red line), the Fama-French model (dotted blue
line) and the Carhart model (dashed green line). For each post-bubble month we calculate the average
standardized abnormal return, multiplied by the average idiosyncratic volatility (CAPM, 4.17%; Fama-
French model, 3.86%; and Carhart model, 3.81%). The averages are then summed up to produce the
cumulative abnormal return series in the figure.
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Figure 5: Effect of Model Misspecification
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(a) Long-run Factor Moments
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(b) Maximum Factor Average
This figure shows how the asymptotic bias in the t-statistic (y-axis) for a structural break in the intercept
is affected by the size of the structural break (x-axis) in a factor exposure in the true model. We assume
that the true model is given by
ri,t−τ = αi,t + βi,t,τf1,t−τ + γi,t f˜t−τ + εi,t,τ , E[εi,t,τ ] = 0, E[ε
2
i,t,τ ] = σ
2
i,t, τ = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1
βi,t,τ =
{
βai,t for τ = ζ + 1, ζ + 2, T − 1
βpi,t for τ = 0, 1, . . . , ζ,
while the estimated model is given by
ri,t−τ = ai,t,τ + bi,tf1,t−τ + c
′
i,tf˜
′
t−τ + ei,t,τ , E[ei,t,τ ] = 0, τ = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1
ai,t,τ =
{
aai,t for τ = ζ + 1, ζ + 2, T − 1
api,t for τ = 0, 1, . . . , ζ.
We plot the expected value of the t-statistic on the difference aai,t − api,t
χ =
√
T∆E[f1]√
∆2Var[f1] +
1
ξ(1−ξ)σ
2
i,t
,
as a function of the size of the true structural break ∆ = β2 − β1. Panel A shows this relation for the
long-run factor moments: CAPM, solid (µ = 0.61%, σ = 5.46%); SMB, dashed (µ = 0.24%, σ = 3.33%);
HML, dotted (µ = 0.402%, σ = 3.59%); and MOM, long dashed (µ = 0.70, σ = 4.83%). In Panel B,
we use the largest ten-year average in our sample: CAPM, solid (µ = 1.46%, σ = 3.21%); SMB, dashed
(µ = 0.99%, σ = 5.73%); HML, dotted (µ = 0.97%, σ = 2.94%); and MOM, long dashed (µ = 1.37,
σ = 5.20%). We have ξ = 1/2, T = 120, and σ2i,t = 4%.
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